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ABSTRACT 
 
REAL ESTATE AND MORTGAGE CRISIS 
A STUDY ON THE UNITED STATES  
Karataş, Bilge 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Taner Yiğit 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 Like every asset price boom, the US Real Estate Boom expanded the 
economy until the burst occurred. Although the existence of an “irrational” boom 
was apparent, it has been questioned whether the increase suggested a bubble. This 
thesis analyzes the evolution of the US Real Estate Crisis and suggests that the real 
estate price increase was a bubble. A time series analysis is performed for the years 
1990-2006, using monthly data on the US house prices, consumer prices, income per 
capita, population, unemployment rate, mortgage rate and housing starts. The results 
indicate that consumer prices and income per capita explain the trend in the housing 
prices, prior to the bubble. During the bubble, except population the fundamentals 
fall short in explaining the housing prices. 
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ÖZET 
 
GAYRĐMENKUL VE MORTGAGE KRĐZĐ 
AMERĐKA BĐRLEŞĐK DEVLETLERĐ ÜZERĐNE BĐR ÇALIŞMA 
 Karataş, Bilge 
Mastır, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Taner Yiğit 
 
Mayıs 2009 
 
  Her varlık fiyat patlaması gibi, ABD Emlak Fiyatları Patlaması da ilk etapta 
ekonominin genişlemesine sebep oldu. Her ne kadar "mantıksız" patlamanın varlığı 
belli olsa da, bu artışın balon olup olmadığı sorgulanmıştır. Bu tez ABD Emlak 
krizinin geçirdiği evrimi analiz etmekte ve emlak fiyat artışının balon olduğunu 
göstermektedir .Araştımada 1990-2006 yılları için ampirik zaman serisi analizi, ABD 
ev fiyatları, tüketici fiyatları, kişi başına düşen gelir, nüfus, işsizlik oranı, ipotekli 
konut oranı ve yeni konut sayıları aylık verileri kullanılarak yapılmıştır. Analizin 
sonucu tüketici fiyatları ve kişi başına düşen gelirin konut fiyatlarındaki balon 
eğilimi öncesinde konut fiyatlarındaki artışı açıklardığını göstermektedir. Konut 
fiyatları balonu sırasında, nüfus haricinde temel hiçbir indikatörün konut fiyat artışı 
üzerinde etkisi yoktur. 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Emlak Fiyatları, Mortgage Krizi 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
With the crash of the US mortgage market in the beginning of 2007, high 
amount of financial companies declared their bankruptcy and many financial market 
leaders have experienced considerable decreases in their stock prices which have also 
affected global stock markets. Mortgage crisis has not only affected financial firms 
with poor lending standards but also created serious consequences for the whole US 
economy. 
 
After the stock market boom and bust and terrorist attacks in the United 
States in 2001, when the GDP growth was only 0.5%, the economy started to recover 
again with the increase in investment which has had positive impact on both 
employment and consumer demand. Rising real estate prices has made a huge 
contribution in regaining the economic activities through high level of consumer 
confidence and improved economic expectations. 
 
However the increase in real estate prices was far more than the inflation rate. 
According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home-Price Index, house prices in the US 
increased by 124% between 1997 and 2006. This was one of the main indicators that 
 2 
the rise in the house prices could have been a “bubble”, which has been defined by 
Kindleberger (1987) as:  
a sharp increase in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous 
process,   with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and 
attracting new buyers – generally speculators interested in profits from 
trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity”.  
 
During a house price bubble, homebuyers think that a home that they would 
normally consider too expensive for them is now acceptable purchase because they 
will be compensated by significant further price increases (Case and Shiller, 2003: 
299-362).  
 
Various economists analyzed this phenomenon in the US and have come to 
different conclusions. According to Case and Shiller (2003: 299-362), the rise in 
housing prices clearly indicated a housing bubble. On the other hand McCarthy and 
Peach (2005), made counter argument that the high house prices were not off the line 
considering the fundamentals. This question has been answered in view of the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in the beginning of 2007 that has affected not only US 
economy but the global society. Actually, Shiller had been arguing that there would 
be epic decline in house prices. He said “People think that home prices go up a lot, 
but home prices in 1990 were at about the same level as in 1890.” (Fox, 2007). 
 
According to Allen and Gale (2000: 236-255), asset bubbles have three 
district phases: The first phase is the expansion of credit with the increase in lending 
which is the result of financial liberalization followed by the central bank. With the 
increase in lending, asset prices (such as real estate or stock) start to increase. In the 
second phase the rise continues for several years until the burst of the bubble leading 
to a collapse in the asset prices. Bursting happens when people’s expectations about 
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the future prices start to change. In the third phase many agents that have borrowed 
to buy these assets at inflated prices start to default, leading to banking and foreign 
exchange crises. Thus, the burst of the bubble affects the whole economy by 
disruption in financial and real activity (output reduction, deflationary pressures) and 
this can last for several years. The U.S.A. has entered the third stage in February 
2007, when the subprime mortgage crisis became the headline issue with the high 
rates of delinquencies and foreclosures.  
 
In this thesis, the US mortgage crisis is analyzed, with a further focus on 
providing an empirical analysis on capturing the refraction in the correlation between 
increase in the house prices and consumer prices. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is as follows: In the second chapter the evolution 
of the mortgage crisis is summarized by dividing the crisis in the three phases that 
have been described by Allen and Gale. The third chapter reviews the literature about 
asset and real estate bubbles. The fourth chapter focuses on the analysis which 
attempts to capture the change in the pattern of the percent increase in house prices 
and to empirically show that the effect of consumer prices on house prices disappears 
with the start of the bubble. For this purpose, the model by Case and Shiller (2003) is 
employed, using monthly time series data for the U.S. economy between 1990 and 
2006. Policy Implications will be proposed in the fifth chapter and the conclusion 
will be given in the sixth chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
 
 
II.1.First Phase of the Real Estate Crisis: The Start and Growth of Bubble 
 
From the beginning of 2001, Federal Reserve started to follow expansionary 
monetary policy with the cut in the short term Fed Funds rate by half a percentage 
point, to 6%. In addition, after the dotcom burst and terrorist attacks, with the fear of 
deflation Fed continued cutting the interest rates until they reached 1% in 2003 
which was the lowest rate of 45 years. The main reason for this policy was to avoid 
more severe downturn and panic in the financial system by injecting ample liquidity 
in to the markets (Belke and Wiedmann, 2005). It has been known that high liquidity 
increases the chances of bubbles. Volatility of stock markets has made returns to 
property more attractive encouraging a portfolio shift from equities to real estate. 
With low interest rates, homebuyers can comfortably service bigger mortgages and 
support higher house prices, resulting in an increasing demand. 
 
On the other side of the phenomenon there has been an increase in the sub-
prime mortgages starting from the mid-1990s. Sub-prime mortgages are loans made 
to borrowers who are perceived to have high credit risk, often because they lack a 
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strong credit history or have other characteristics that are associated with high 
probabilities of default (Bernanke, 2007). This distinction can be made by looking at 
the loan to value (LTV) and debt service to income (DTV) ratios. Borrowers who 
have DTIs above 55% or LTVs over 85% are likely to be considered sub-prime (Kiff 
and Mills, 2007) and they are demanded higher interest payments, generally 2 
percent higher, than prime borrowers. Sub-prime market has become active with the 
introduction of adjustable-rate-mortgages1 in 1982. In 1986, the Tax Reform Act left 
residential mortgages as the only consumer loans on which the interest was tax 
deductible. This made home equity withdrawal a preferred means of financing home 
improvements and personal consumption relative to other forms of consumer loans. 
Besides this, automated underwriting 2  has led to easier credit scoring with 
technological advances and securitization3 made the mortgages easily tradable with 
the introduction of mortgage-backed securities. These improvements have helped the 
development of the sub-prime mortgage market by relaxing of the credit rationing of 
the borrowers who were previously considered too risky by lenders (Kiff and Mills, 
2007). 
 
Thus with the increase in sub-prime lending there has been a considerable 
increase in the homeownership rate4 since the households that might not reached the 
resources before have easy access to the mortgages (Figure 1). Non-conforming sub-
prime mortgages have rapidly taken the place of the mortgages that are guaranteed 
                                                 
1
 Interest rate is periodically adjusted based on an index, for the U.S.A. it can be LIBOR, COFI, MTA, 
etc. This suggests that payments of borrower may change (in the interest rate resets). 
2
 Underwriting is done to determine risk-based price by looking at the credit history and LTVs of the 
borrowers. 
3
 Securitization which allows intermediaries to pool large number of mortgages and to sell the 
resulting cash flows to investors has separated the original lender from borrower who is the ultimate 
bearer of credit risk. 
4
  The number of owner-occupied housing units is divided by the number of occupied housing units or 
households. 
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by Federal Housing Association (FHA) which has less flexibility and low lending 
limits. By 2006, only 51% of mortgage loans were conforming loans (requires 
detailed credit history) and the remaining part was consisting of Alt-A, a category 
between prime and sub-prime mortgages, and sub-prime loans both of which contain 
high delinquency risks. 
 
Figure 1: Homeownership Rate for the USA (1965-2005) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
The increase in the mortgage borrowing has led to a rise in the demand for 
houses. However, the supply side of the industry cannot respond immediately to the 
increased demand due to the time lag of new construction. Thus, real estate market is 
mainly driven by demand factors, at this case by low interest rates. Therefore this has 
led to the increase of the house prices.  
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II.1.1. The Indicators of the Bubble 
 
There are various indicators that can be taken into account in order to decide 
if the increase in the real estate prices in the US showed bubble symptoms. In this 
part the most crucial three indicators are discussed: The Affordability Index, the ratio 
of house prices to rents and the relation between house prices and consumer prices. 
 
II.1.1.1. The Affordability Index 
 
From the definition of Realtors, Affordability Index shows the ability of a 
median income household to afford the payments of a mortgage loan. For this index 
100 means that the household has enough income to pay the down payments and 
monthly mortgage payments of the mortgage loan. If the index is above 100, then the 
median income household has more than enough income to afford the mortgage 
payments. (National Association of REALTORS) 5  From Figure 2, although the 
affordabilty index has been above 100, it has been decreasing gradually since 2003. 
The decrease from January 2003 to August 2007 is 22% which means that debts of 
median income households have been incresing relative to their income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The index takes both fixed-rate-mortgages and adjustable-rate-mortgages into account and calculates 
a composite mortgage payment. 
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Figure 2: Housing Affordability Index for the U.S.A. (Jan 2003-Aug 2007) 
 
Source: Research Division of the National Association of REALTORS 
 
 
II.1.1.2. House Prices to Rents Ratio 
 
House prices to rents ratio has the same intuition as the price to earning ratio, 
known as “Gordon Equation”: The market value of an asset is determined by the 
present risk adjusted discounted value of its expected income stream.6 So, the price 
of a house should reflect the future benefits of ownership which is indicated by rental 
income earned by a landlord or the implicit rent saved by an owner-occupier (The 
Economist, 2003). If Price/Rents ratio is high, meaning the house prices are 
increasing faster relative to rents, then the houses are bought because of the 
expectation of future increase in the prices. In the US there has been a divergence 
between house rents and prices, the ratio reached its highest value in May 2006 with 
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Where Pt is the price of the asset, Et is the earnings, δ is percentage share of earnings, g 
is the growth rate of earnings, i is the risk-free interest rate and ρ is the risk premium. This equation 
indicates that the price of an asset should rise as the risk-free interest rate and/or risk premium falls. 
(IMF World Economic Outlook, 2000:78-79) 
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83% (see Figure 3), which clearly indicates that individuals buy houses for 
speculative reasons. These buyers do not base their investment decisions on future 
income streams from rents but on higher resale price at a future date.  
 
Figure 3: US House Prices to Rents Ratio (Jan 2000- Aug 2007) (2000=100) 
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Sources: Standard&Poor’s Case-Shiller Index and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI, Rent of 
Primary Residence (all urban consumers) 
 
 
 
II.1.1.3. House Prices and Consumer Prices 
 
Former to the housing bubble, it has been said that house prices and inflation 
tended to move parallel. However, the dramatic increase in the house prices has 
broken down this relationship between consumer prices and house prices. Figure 4 
depicts the monthly trend of the ratio between the house price index to the consumer 
price index, for the period between January 1990 and September 2007.  
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Figure 4: Ratio of Case & Shiller House Price Index to Consumer Price Index 
(January 1990-September 2007) 
 
 
Sources: Standard&Poor’s Case-Shiller Index and U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics CPI (all urban 
cons) 
 
It can clearly be seen from this figure that after 2000, the increase in house 
prices outweighed the increase in consumer prices. The house prices doubled the 
consumer price index in 2005, when the house prices reached the peak. Further 
empirical focus is given to this relationship in the succeeding chapters. 
  
Consequently, these indicators precisely suggest that there have been 
fundamental misalignments in the US real estate market. 
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II.2. Second Phase of the Real Estate Crisis: The Peak and Burst of the Bubble 
 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) conducts various 
researches on the house prices and publishes house price index for the U.S.A. every 
quarter7. According to the report of OFHEO the house prices in the United States has 
increased by 50.76% in five years as of June 2007. The yearly appreciation of the 
house prices was 10%. For second quarter of 2005, where the appreciation reached 
its peak, the annualized growth of the prices was 14.05 %.  
 
As credit becomes more freely available, there is a positive wealth effect: if 
lenders increase their loans relative to house values and borrowers’ incomes, the 
negative effect of rising property prices on first-time buyers’ spending will fall. 
Homeowners can borrow or refinance non-housing debts using the increased 
collateral value of their property. 
 
Figure 5: OFHEO House Price Index History for the USA (1990 Q1-2007 Q2) 
 
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
                                                 
7
 OFHEO and Case&Shiller use the similar index construction methodology. 
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The increase in the prices led to huge gains in the US economy until its rapid 
burst. Despite the sharp fall in share prices and a worldwide plunge in industrial 
production, business investment and profits, consumer spending has held up 
relatively well, supported by low interest rates and the wealth-boosting effects of 
rising house prices. Boosting wealth not only increased spending, but also allowed 
owners to borrow more against the rising value of their homes (The Economist, 
2002). 
 
The number of housing starts jumped from 1.5 million at an annual rate in 
August 2000 to a peak 2.3 million in January 2006. In 2005, housing construction 
accounted for 6.2% of GDP which was the highest rate since 1950 (The Economist, 
2007). This has also led to increasing employment rates in the real estate market. 
Real estate, residential construction and three other housing related Labor 
Department job categories together add up to 6.6% of U.S. employment. They 
accounted for 46% of the new jobs created in the U.S. between January 2001 and 
May 2006 (Fox, 2007). 
 
Also, financial markets gained a lot from the housing bubble. According to 
Wall Street Journal, from 2004 to 2006, more than 2500 banks, thrifts, credit unions 
and mortgage companies made a combined $1.5 trillion in the risky high-interest-rate 
mortgage loans. 
 
This positive image, however, did not last long. In 2004, Federal Reserve 
started to increase its short term funds rate gradually from 1%, until it reached to 
5.25% in June 2006 (see Figure 6). As Shiller (2000) argued, tightened monetary 
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policy, which was the rise in the interest rates, is associated with the bursting of the 
bubbles. 
 
Figure 6: Federal Reserve Short Term Funds Rate (1990-2007) 
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Source: Federal Reserve 
 
With the slow-down in the increase of the house prices and the upward 
movement in the interest rates on both fixed and adjustable rate mortgages in 2006, 
there has been a rapid deterioration in the mortgage loans originated in 2006. 
Formerly, rising house prices combined with low interest rate levels made 
prepayment easy for distressed borrowers since their equity had an increasing value. 
However, increased monthly payments and decreased equity value forced subprime 
borrowers to default on their payments. The rise in deliquencies has led to the rise in 
the foreclosures. In the fourth quarter of 2006, about 310,000 foreclosure 
proceedings were initiated. However the quarterly average for the previous two years 
was 230,000. In the second quarter of 2007, almost 3% of subprime loans entered 
foreclosure (The Economist, 2007). 
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Figure 7: Adjustable-Rate Mortgages Delinquencies and Foreclosures (1998-
2007) 
 
Source: Citigroup 
 
As the underlying pace of mortgage originations began to slow, but with 
investor demand for securities with high yields still strong, some lenders evidently 
loosened underwriting standards.  So-called “risk-layering”, combining weak 
borrower credit histories with other risk factors, such as incomplete income 
documentation or very high cumulative LTV, became more common.  These looser 
standards were likely an important source for the rise in "early payment defaults"(see 
Figure 8)--defaults occurring within a few months of origination--among subprime 
ARMs, especially those originated in 2006 (Bernanke, 2007). 
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Figure 8: Early Payment Defaults 
 
Source: Credit Suisse and Loan Performance 
 
The improvements in the mortgage market that are mentioned before has also 
increased the rates of deliquencies in the market. With securitization assesing the risk 
was particularly difficult when risky mortgages were packed into securities that 
combined other types of risk profiles. Hence, lenders have bought mortgage-backed 
securities not knowing the risk they entailed. Mostly banks with subprime-specialist 
subsidiaries and speciality finance companies have adversely affected from subprime 
crisis. Since mid-2006, some non-depository, poorly capitalized firms representing 
40% of 2006 subprime originations have closed down operations, declared 
bankruptcy or been bailed out (Kiff and Mills, 2007). 
 
Foreclosures have led to an increase in the vacancy rates because owners 
have had to leave their properties. As can be seen from the Figure 9, the housing 
vacancy rate for the US has started to rise sharply since the second quarter of 2006, 
with the increase in the delinquency rates. 
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 Figure 9: Quarterly Housing Vacancy Rate for the US (1995 Q1-2007 Q3) 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau (Based on current population survey) 
  
 
II.3. Third Phase of the Real Estate Crisis: The Impacts on the Economy 
  
The rise in the demand on houses, forced the supply side of the market to 
become active. New constructions have increased rapidly until 2006. While demand 
was beginning to decline, homebuilders were still running at a high speed. Because 
of the time lag between demand and supply in the real estate industry, the slowing 
down in construction, which can be clearly seen from the decline in the number of 
housing starts (the number of new constructions), in Figure 10, has started in the 
second quarter of 2006.  
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Figure 10: New Housing Units Started in the U.S.A. (Jan 2000- Aug 2007) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
The impact of the diminished demand on the supply side of the economy can 
also be observed by the decrease in the construction expenses (Figure 11). The hit in 
construction also hit the labor market. According to the Labor Department (2007), 
job creation had lurched into reverse after four years of gains. 
Figure 11: Construction Expenditures in the US (1993-2007) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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The defaults on the subprime mortgages have decreased the reliability of the 
mortgage backed securities. Major lenders as Countrywide Financial have tightened 
the credit conditions and avoided sub-prime lending. Overall sub-prime originations 
were down by 50 percent from the second quarter of 2007. Not only mortgage 
lenders and thrifts as Washington Mutual have incurred considerable losses, but also 
major banks such as Citigroup, brokerage firms such as Merrill Lynch, the two 
government sponsored mortgage-finance firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
been severely hit by the mortgage crisis (Isidore, 2007). 
 
Banks raised 3-month interbank rates, because they lack the confindence to 
loan money to one another. The credit squeeze has raised market interest rates which 
made harder for distressed borrowers to finance. Since August 2007, Fed has injected 
liquidity to the markets to ensure their smooth functioning. Besides this, Fed has also 
decreased the short-term fed funds rate by 0.75% to 4.50% to overcome the adverse 
affects of the credit crunch. 
 
The tighter credit conditions leads to a deeper and more protracted housing 
downturn then assumed. This would extend the decline in the residential investment 
and put great downward pressure on the household finance and consumption.  
 
Consequently, the reduction in household and construction spending and the 
increase in the unemployment, has been rising from 4.4% in April 2007 to 4.7% in 
September 2007, will further weaken the growth of GDP, which had grown only by 
0.9% in the first quarter of 2007. In addition, RealtyTrac, a company that tracks 
foreclosures, has estimated up to 1.5 million households has entered the foreclosure 
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process in 2007, double 2006's figure, and with some 2.5 million adjustable-rate 
mortgages resetting to higher rates before the end of 2008 (The Economist, 2007).  
 
Rising delinquencies on these so-called sub-prime home loans in the US were 
infecting a broad swathe of markets around the world at an alarming pace. Northern 
Rock and the Clemos were swept up in the global credit crisis. The reason of this 
widespread effect of mortgage crisis is the securitization that has made trading the 
mortgages easily while spreading their risks all over the world to prevent major 
financial institution from collapsing. It has also tied far-flung markets more closely 
together. That means a crisis in a niche market in one country can contaminate lots of 
other markets that at first glance have little to do with each other. Technology 
transfers information in seconds, giving the infection a more potent scope (Barr, 
2007). For instance the M&G Investment Management, which is a London-based 
investment firm, expects $400 billion and Scottish Widows Investment Partnership, 
with almost $200 billion in assets, experienced that blow-up firsthand on 20th of 
August 2007. 
 
The first effect of the sub-prime mortgage backed securities on the overseas 
emerged in July 2007 when German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG was 
bailed out by state-owned KFW Group. Three months later German savings banks 
rescued Sachsen LB. In addition to these incidents some of the world’s most known 
banks (besides Citigroup) as HSBC and ABN Amro has lent huge amounts of money 
to money market managers who have been trying to fight with the sub-prime crisis. 
In the UK the situation was not different Barclays PLC had to finance Cairn High 
Grade Funding, an investment vehicle and HBOS PLC lent a huge amount of money 
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to Grampian. The Bank of England had given billions of pounds in emergency loans 
to Northern Rock to keep it afloat. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON BUBBLES 
 
 
 
In regard to property bubbles Robert Shiller is one of the major researchers in 
this area. He made his name in the 1980s by attacking the notion that “the stock 
market rationally reflects the true value of the companies whose shares are traded on 
it” (Fox, 2007). In March 2000, he analyzed the stock market bubble in his book 
“Irrational Exuberance”. “Irrational Exuberance” which means wishful thinking on 
the part of investors is often used to describe a heightened state of speculative fervor. 
The phrase was first used by Alan Greenspan at the Annual Dinner and Francis 
Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in 
December 5, 1996. His words were  
...sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower 
risk      premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We 
can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and 
the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational 
exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to 
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past 
decade?” 
 
These words indicate that there could be speculative bubble in the stock 
market and a possibility of a decline in stock prices. Immediately after those words, 
the stock market in Tokyo, which was open as he was giving this speech, fell sharply, 
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and closed down 3% and Hong Kong fell by 3%. Then markets in Frankfurt and 
London fell by 4%. The stock market in the US fell by 2% at the open of trade. The 
strong reaction of the markets to Greenspan's seemingly harmless question was 
widely noted, and made the term irrational exuberance famous.  
 
Shiller (2000), mentions psychological factors that affect people’s decisions: 
“People do not even know to any degree of accuracy what the “right” level of market 
is: not many of them spend much time thinking about what its level should be or 
whether it is over/under priced today.”  There is a “money illusion” in the markets 
that people take into account nominal interest rates rather than real interest rates as 
happened in the real estate market. In addition he also indicates that speculative 
bubble cannot grow forever, when demand decreases then the growth in the asset 
prices stop. 
 
These psychological factors were also apparent in the mortgage market. 
Because of the bubble concerns in the media, Case and Shiller (2000)8 conducted a 
survey in several cities of the US and found out some interesting results about the 
homeowners point of views regarding the housing market. 90 percent of the 
homeowners expected an increase in the future house prices and they did not 
perceive themselves in the middle of bubble even at the height of the bubble. In 
addition, homeowners indicated that they have found investment on house is safer 
than investing on stocks and they have changed their portfolios from stock market to 
real estate markets. They indicated that nominal interest rates are the most important 
reason for them to decide on buying the house. Economists have been arguing on this 
                                                 
8
 Survey has been done on 2000 individuals, who bought new houses between March and August 
2002, in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston and Milwaukee. 
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issue, because although nominal interest rates were low, since the inflation level was 
also low, real interest rates on mortgages were high. However, as this survey 
suggests while borrowing, households take nominal interest rates into consideration. 
Figure 12 shows the movement of monthly nominal and real average contract 
mortgage rates for the years between 1995 and 2007. Although the nominal rates 
have followed a stationary path during this period, the real mortgage rates were 
highly volatile and they have increased dramatically in the last two years. Thus the 
“money illusion” clearly showed itself in the mortgage market. 
 
Figure 12: Nominal and Real National Average Contract Mortgage Rates 
(January 1995- September 2007) 
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Other major studies in these fields are the ones conducted by Case, Quigley 
and Shiller (2001) and Case and Shiller (2003). Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001), 
looked at the relationship between increases in housing wealth, financial wealth, and 
consumer spending. They have conducted a panel data analysis firstly with 14 
countries using annual data in the years between 1975 and 1999 for various periods. 
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Secondly they used a panel with quarterly data of US states for the years between 
1982 and 1999. The estimation has been done by relating consumption to income and 
wealth measures. The results suggest that mainly for the United States, the real estate 
market is more important in determining the consumption behavior of households 
than the stock market. Accordingly, wealth effect is stronger in real estate market. 
This suggests that when the house prices increase consumers increase their spending 
much more than the effect of an increase in the stock prices.  
 
The study by Case and Shiller (2003) has also related house prices with 
income. They have done empirical research and conducted a questionnaire survey to 
find out the symptoms of the bubble. Their empirical research was based on defining 
house prices by looking at the major economic indicators as population, employment, 
number of housing starts, income per capita, mortgage rate and unemployment rate. 
Their research focused on prices – volatile states for the period 1985-2002. They 
have found that income explains the changes in the house prices and during the 
period 2000-2002 they could not reject the null hypothesis that a bubble existed in 
the states that they have studied.  
 
On the other hand, McCarthy and Peach (2005) arrived to the conclusion that 
there was no bubble in the housing market in United States. The main argument that 
they have based their reasoning was that OFHEO house price index is not a truly 
“constant quality” index which means that the increases in this index could have 
been caused by the increase in the quality of the houses. Thus, although they have 
found an increase in the price/rents ratio, they argued that, OFHEO index was 
misleading. Besides this, they also argued that the decrease in the interest rates has 
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created a doubt of bubble. Thus without taking into account the other considerations, 
as the dramatic increase in the mortgage lending, in house prices in major states, in 
the construction expenditures and expectations, and basing their reasoning on a not 
supported argument, they came in to the suspicious conclusion that there was no 
house price bubble. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: The Relation Between House Prices and 
Consumer Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
It has unambiguously been observed in various empirical papers that the 
increase in house prices tended to move parallel with the increase in consumer prices, 
prior to 1999 (Lansing, 2008). However, the dramatic rise in the house prices from 
2000 onwards ceased this parallel relationship. To analyze this refraction, an 
empirical analysis is conducted in this chapter.  
 
 
IV.1. Model 
 
The analysis of this thesis is based on the study by Case and Schiller (2003). 
In an attempt to ameliorate their model, several modifications have been made. First 
of all, instead of using quarterly data, monthly data is employed. In search of the 
relation between house prices and consumer prices, the monthly percentage change 
in consumer prices is included. Furthermore, the variable employment has been 
eliminated from the model. Lastly, the entire period is divided into two time periods 
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in order to capture the structural break in the end of 1999. The first period runs from 
January 1990 until December 1999, and the second period starts from January 2000 
and lasts until December 2006. This break follows logically from the fact that the 
bubble has started in the beginning of 2000.  
 
The model that is analyzed is denoted by equation (1): 
(1) 
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It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between the increase in the 
house prices and consumer prices in the first period, January 1990 - December 1999, 
that the expected coefficient for the change in the CPI is positive and significant. In 
the second period, from January 2000 until December 2006, it is expected this 
relationship to break, meaning that previously positive and significant coefficient 
becomes insignificant in the second period. This will indicate that the consumer 
prices do not have any influence on the movement of house prices. Additionally, it is 
expected that the macroeconomic indicators also will fall short in explaining the 
house price growth for the second period analysis. The rationale for this expectation 
is to prove the movement in the house prices was solely directed by speculative and 
psychological factors rather than by the movement in the economic indicators.  
 
 
IV.2.Data 
 
In order to estimate the model (1), monthly data is employed for the time 
period from January 1990 until December 2006. The total number of observations is 
 28 
204. The dependent variable is measured as the monthly percentage change in the 
house prices which are taken from the Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Index.  
 
One independent variable is the percentage change in the Consumer Price 
Index, which is taken from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 
data reflects all urban consumers and is seasonally adjusted. Another regressor is the 
variable Personal Income and Its Disposition, which is seasonally adjusted at annual 
rates and is measured in billions of dollars. The data is from the National Accounts 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Thirdly, population data are retrieved from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
measured in thousands of individuals. Fourthly, the Civilian Unemployment Rate is 
collected from the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data is 
seasonally adjusted, and is measured in months in percentages, for individuals of age 
16 and older. Fifthly, seasonally adjusted at annual rates data on Housing Starts is 
taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce: U.S. Census Bureau. Lastly, our 
measure for the mortgage rate as expressed in percentages is the National Average 
Contract Mortgage Rate which is taken from the Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information 
Website.  
 
 
IV.3.Results 
 
Empirical analysis departed from employing an OLS regression measuring 
the percentage change in house prices using the fundamentals mentioned above (and 
denoted in equation 1). First, in order to verify the assumption of the existence of the 
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structural break, a representative regression of the model for the whole sample period, 
between 1990 and 2006 has been conducted. (Appendix Table A1). Chow 
Breakpoint test is done for the first month of 2000 in order to clarify the structural 
break (can be seen in the Appendix, Table A2) The P-value of the test is 0.00 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no structural change in the house price changes 
before and after January 2000 is rejected.  
 
Second, since the analysis involves time series, at this point it is important to 
test for serial correlation. The Durbin- Watson test statistic from the representative 
regression shows a low value (0.30) indicating that there exists first-order 
autocorrelation in the model. In order to test for higher order correlation, Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test is conducted with including lags up to 2. The test 
rejected the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Table A3 in Appendix depicts 
the correlogram of squared residuals, from which it can be seen that there is 
autocorrelation and partial correlation. Following these indications, the analysis on 
two different periods is done with second order autoregressive process and second 
order moving average error processes, i.e. ARMA (2,2). Before analyzing the results, 
it is crucial at this point to test the structural break with Wald test by using the 
regressions of two different time periods.  
 
The validity of the Chow test is limited because it assumes the variances of 
residuals in two sub-samples are equal. Thus it is convenient to conduct the structural 
break test with Wald test in case the residual variance is different.  The null 
hypothesis is no structural break with a Chi-square distribution.  
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The Wald test is constructed as: 
(2)   ( ) ( ) ( )2112121 ' bbVVbbW −+−= −  
Where 1b  and 2b  are coefficient vectors for two estimated models and 1V and 2V  are 
the covariance matrices for the models. Using E-views, Wald test is 56.69, the 
probability of Chi-square distribution with eleven degrees of freedom is 0.00 
suggesting that the null hypothesis of no structural break is rejected.  In the next sub-
sections the results of the two regressions are going to be analyzed in detail. 
 
 
IV.3.1. Results for the period 1990 – 1999  
 
The OLS regression results for the period 1990-1999 have been tested for the 
existence of heteroskedasticity. White-test rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity with a P-value of 0.003. Accordingly the regression is done by 
controlling both for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation –using Newey-West 
Errors. Because of the change in the method, it is crucial to conduct the Wald-test for 
structural break for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent regression 
results, the test again has been conducted in the same way as before and the P-value 
again rejects the null of no structural break for the results between two regressions. 
The results thereof for the first sub-sample are depicted in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent OLS for 1990-1999 
Dependent Variable: PERHPI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M03 1999M12  
Included observations: 118 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 27 iterations  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
MA Backcast: 1990M01 1990M02   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PERCP 0.241077 0.138367 1.742292 0.0843 
INCOME 0.196018 0.043923 4.462767 0.0000 
POP -5.342663 3.565874 -1.498276 0.1370 
RNMAR 0.042684 0.062966 0.677892 0.4993 
START -1.30E-05 0.000249 -0.052378 0.9583 
UNEMP 0.067321 0.073281 0.918661 0.3603 
C -4.011484 1.895126 -2.116738 0.0366 
AR(1) 1.666425 0.050323 33.11455 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.915740 0.047538 -19.26326 0.0000 
MA(1) -0.824079 0.125567 -6.562835 0.0000 
MA(2) 0.270024 0.152405 1.771759 0.0793 
     
     R-squared 0.882377     Mean dependent var 0.164080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.871384     S.D. dependent var 0.547250 
S.E. of regression 0.196260     Akaike info criterion -0.330164 
Sum squared resid 4.121439     Schwarz criterion -0.071880 
Log likelihood 30.47970     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.225293 
F-statistic 80.26874     Durbin-Watson stat 2.003309 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots  .83-.47i      .83+.47i  
Inverted MA Roots  .41+.32i      .41-.32i  
     
 
The adjusted R-squared of the regression is 0.87, which indicates a reasonable 
fit. The table reveals that the percentage change in consumer prices is significant at 
10% level and has a positive coefficient indicating that a 1% increase in the 
consumer prices increases house prices by 0.24%. This result supports the 
expectation that prior to the rapid increase in the house prices, consumer prices and 
house prices were positively correlated. Personal Income has highly significant and 
positive coefficient indicating an increase in the income increases house prices since 
it increases the demand for houses. Other fundamentals do not prove to have 
significant effects on house prices. Population variable has a negative and 
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insignificant coefficient which does not give a rational interpretation. Mortgage rate 
as well has insignificant and wrong signed coefficient since it is expected that an 
increase in the mortgage rate would decrease the house prices instead of increasing 
them. Housing starts do not have a coefficient significantly different from zero, thus 
the influence of this variable on house prices do not exist. The unemployment rate 
has a low coefficient which is insignificant. Positive and significant AR(1) suggests 
an increase in house prices mostly depends on the previous periods. AR(2) is 
significant but has a negative coefficient. Additionally, both of the moving averages 
are significant, although the first moving average has a negative sign. Thus, the 
percentage increase depends on both first and second past errors. This shows an 
important characteristic of the house price changes: one can explain house prices by 
looking at the previous pattern of the house prices besides income and the percentage 
increase in the consumer prices. 
 
 
IV.3.2 Results for the period 2000 – 2006 
 
The regression for the second sample period has been conducted again using 
the Newey-West Error corrected regression since the White-test for this sub-period 
again represented heteroskedasticity (Table A4; Appendix). The performance of the 
regression for this time period is depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent OLS for 2000-2006 
 
Dependent Variable: PERHPI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 2000M01 2006M12   
Included observations: 84   
Convergence achieved after 31 iterations  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Backcast: 1999M11 1999M12   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PERCP -0.171559 0.117465 -1.460513 0.1484 
INCOME -0.082342 0.054533 -1.509939 0.1354 
POP 18.08159 8.530006 2.119763 0.0374 
RNMAR -0.139839 0.108134 -1.293200 0.2000 
START -0.000160 0.000168 -0.953437 0.3435 
UNEMP 0.297155 0.156899 1.893925 0.0622 
C 1.495635 1.953847 0.765482 0.4465 
AR(1) 1.388923 0.164839 8.425929 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.581516 0.153438 -3.789921 0.0003 
MA(1) -0.085163 0.176717 -0.481919 0.6313 
MA(2) 0.315298 0.152851 2.062775 0.0427 
     
     R-squared 0.893053     Mean dependent var 0.963779 
Adjusted R-squared 0.878402     S.D. dependent var 0.611518 
S.E. of regression 0.213241     Akaike info criterion -0.131236 
Sum squared resid 3.319449     Schwarz criterion 0.187085 
Log likelihood 16.51191     F-statistic 60.95796 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.927873     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots  .69-.32i      .69+.32i  
Inverted MA Roots  .04+.56i      .04-.56i  
     
     
 
In this regression adjusted R-squared is 0.88, which represents same level of 
goodness of fit with the first sub-sample regression. As was expected, the positive 
and significant coefficient of the percentage change of the CPI is replaced by a 
negative and insignificant coefficient in this period. This shows that the behavior of 
the house price increase cannot be explained with the increase in the consumer prices. 
Additionally the positive coefficient of income becomes insignificant and negative.  
Thus this variable falls short in explaining the pattern of the house prices. In this 
regression, population has a significant effect, 5%, on the change of the house prices 
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indicating that an increase in the population increases the house prices. However the 
other variables cannot explain the change in the house prices. Mortgage Rate has 
negative and insignificant coefficient; the coefficient of Housing Starts is 
insignificant and close to zero. The unemployment rate, however, has a significant 
coefficient at 10% level but has a positive sign, which does not make sense in 
explaining house prices. Furthermore, it is found that AR(1) and AR(2) are 
significant, suggesting that an increase in the house prices cannot be explained by 
any fundamentals ( except population), but its previous realizations.  
 
Thus, the empirical analysis represented in this part proves the hypothesis that 
the increase in consumer prices cannot explain the increase in the house prices after 
2000, after the housing bubble started. The positive and significant coefficient of CPI 
for the first sub-period becomes negative and insignificant in the second period. 
Furthermore, it has been found that the following independent variables do not have 
the expected influence house price increases; unemployment rate, mortgage rate, and 
housing starts. Consumer prices and income per capita influence the housing price 
increase before the bubble; population influences the increase in the house prices 
after the bubble. The influence of income has also been encountered in the study 
done by Case and Shiller (2003). However, they have found that only income 
explains the trend in the house prices, whereas in this study the influence of the 
consumer prices has also been apparent. Since Case and Shiller (2003) do not include 
CPI in their analysis the findings regarding CPI cannot be compared9.  
 
                                                 
9
 In order to see the relationship between the change in the house prices and consumer prices, a 
regression has been conducted with using only inflation rate as the independent variable explaining 
the percentage change in the house prices. That analysis shares the same conclusion with the 
regression conducted in this thesis that the positive coefficient of inflation rate in the first sub-period 
becomes negative and insignificant in the second sub-period. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
Based on the empirical results, one can derive a number of policy 
implications to attempt to accommodate the negative effects of the mortgage crisis. 
To begin with, the market turbulence has caused investors to lose their confidence in 
financial markets. Additionally, banks have increased inter-bank rates, because they 
fear the exposure to risks on the sub-prime mortgage market. In order to change these 
developments, one has to reestablish the confidence of investors. Although this is an 
uncontrollable factor, the Fed attempts to regain trust by liquidity injections and 
interest rate reductions. Additionally, one would be able to regain trust by enhancing 
the transparency of financial institutions.  
 
To alleviate the individuals who are negatively affected by the current crisis, 
a program of loan restructuring has been designed. However, some critics have 
argued that this would worsen the crisis by artificially propping up the home prices. 
If foreclosures occur without intervention, the market would recover faster, since 
decreasing house prices make them affordable to buyers. If instead the adjustable 
mortgage rates are shifted to prime mortgage rates -which are much lower than 
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ARMs-, then the interest payments will become more affordable to sub-prime 
borrowers. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, half of the sub-prime 
borrowers have the adequate credit scoring for a prime mortgage loan. Thus, shifting 
the qualified borrowers to prime rates will reduce the amount of foreclosures 
(Calbreath; 2007). 
 
The current mortgage crisis has also provided policy insights that could be 
employed to limit the effects of any future mortgage crisis. First, in dealing with the 
burst of the housing bubble, one could design better forms of social insurance that 
allow one to manage real risks more effectively. Second, financial regulators should 
protect customers by imposing rules to prevent abusive practices. These arise 
through the intricate contracts that misinform potential customers of the payment 
conditions of the mortgages. Additionally, many borrowers relied on their brokers 
who were earning higher commission rates from sub-prime contracts (Calbreath, 
2007). Financial regulators could also support potential customers through 
counseling and financial education for potential borrowers (Bernanke, 2007). Other 
protections include greater mortgage disclosures of payments over the lifetime of a 
loan and a greater prohibition of deceptive advertising (Sahadi, 2007). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Although the debate on the housing price bubble has shifted to another debate 
concerning increasing regulation in financial markets, it is crucial to analyze the 
causes of the financial crisis and how the house prices started to show bubble 
symptoms. To this aim, the progress of the crisis has been outlined by dividing the 
periods of the crisis as the way it is described by Allen and Gale (2000). During the 
first phase, Fed’s low interest rate policy led to increased credits and demand on real 
estates which led to the increase in house prices. The indicators have pointed that 
house prices cannot be explained by any other parameters than people’s expectations. 
A considerable portion of the increase in house prices can be explained by 
psychology as Shiller (2000) pointed out. In the second phase positive effects of 
bubble and the burst of the bubble has been explained. Third phase has showed the 
crash in the financial market because of the tightening in the lending. Focusing on 
the bubble literature, the regression model by Case and Shiller (2003) has been 
ameliorated and employed. The monthly data for the period 1990-2006 is divided 
into two periods, before and after housing bubble, to indicate the break of the relation 
between house price increase and consumer price increase. The results have 
suggested that for the first period -besides income and the past realizations of the 
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lagged dependent variable and error terms- the inflation rate has a positive and 
significant effect on the house price increase. The second period analysis has showed 
the break in this relationship and led one to conclude that except population, none of 
the fundamentals can explain the sudden growth rate in the house prices.. 
Consequently, the results of the thesis confirm the findings by Case and Shiller (2003) 
and Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001) that the increase in the US housing prices was 
indeed a real estate price bubble which busted in the first months of 2007, leading to 
a mortgage crisis and credit crunch, whereof the effects are still spreading throughout 
the world. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
Table A1: Representative Regression Results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: PERHPI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1990M01 2006M12   
Included observations: 204   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PERCP -0.066498 0.167767 -0.396372 0.6923 
INCOME 0.005257 0.018073 0.290876 0.7715 
POP 8.105672 3.609613 2.245579 0.0258 
RNMAR -0.135618 0.070531 -1.922806 0.0559 
START 0.001183 0.000321 3.683080 0.0003 
UNEMP -0.108831 0.052828 -2.060090 0.0407 
C -0.656625 1.224834 -0.536093 0.5925 
     
     R-squared 0.450764     Mean dependent var 0.490568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.434036     S.D. dependent var 0.695587 
S.E. of regression 0.523294     Akaike info criterion 1.576365 
Sum squared resid 53.94585     Schwarz criterion 1.690222 
Log likelihood -153.7893     F-statistic 26.94667 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.302800     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
 
Table A2: Chow Breakpoint Test 
 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2000M01   
     
     F-statistic 16.90083     Probability 0.000000 
Log likelihood ratio 99.24161     Probability 0.000000 
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Table A3: Correlogram of Squared Residuals 
 
 
Sample: 1990M01 2006M12      
Included observations: 204     
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
       
       .|*****  |        .|*****  | 1 0.670 0.670 92.807 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 2 0.368 -0.145 121.01 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 3 0.127 -0.107 124.39 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 4 -0.012 -0.024 124.42 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 5 -0.059 0.013 125.16 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 6 -0.040 0.034 125.50 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 7 -0.073 -0.117 126.66 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 8 -0.087 -0.008 128.29 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 9 -0.043 0.081 128.69 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 10 -0.043 -0.075 129.09 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 11 -0.047 -0.026 129.57 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 12 -0.041 0.002 129.94 0.000 
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
Table A3:White Heteroskedasticity Test for Period 1990-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
F-statistic 2.199152     Probability 0.003026 
Obs*R-squared 46.90476     Probability 0.010148 
     
     Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Sample: 1990M03 1999M12   
Included observations: 118   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.356748 13.92173 -0.097455 0.9226 
PERCP -3.916091 2.403387 -1.629405 0.1067 
PERCP^2 0.289478 0.197908 1.462687 0.1470 
PERCP*INCOME 0.085446 0.054293 1.573800 0.1190 
PERCP*POP -3.850133 3.384482 -1.137584 0.2583 
PERCP*RNMAR 0.192425 0.088308 2.179010 0.0319 
PERCP*START 0.000195 0.000416 0.469543 0.6398 
PERCP*UNEMP 0.108928 0.113552 0.959275 0.3400 
INCOME -0.190831 0.682603 -0.279563 0.7805 
INCOME^2 0.004439 0.009082 0.488763 0.6262 
INCOME*POP -0.049382 0.653461 -0.075570 0.9399 
INCOME*RNMAR 0.002708 0.020857 0.129832 0.8970 
INCOME*START -6.11E-05 0.000108 -0.565252 0.5733 
INCOME*UNEMP 0.009634 0.029794 0.323334 0.7472 
POP -23.57301 26.07665 -0.903989 0.3684 
POP^2 -48.35282 40.35480 -1.198193 0.2340 
POP*RNMAR 2.237869 1.114500 2.007957 0.0476 
POP*START 0.009342 0.006332 1.475543 0.1436 
POP*UNEMP 0.967470 1.274543 0.759072 0.4498 
RNMAR 0.484340 0.952459 0.508515 0.6123 
RNMAR^2 -0.021683 0.023021 -0.941872 0.3488 
RNMAR*START -0.000211 0.000171 -1.232798 0.2209 
RNMAR*UNEMP -0.037987 0.043013 -0.883146 0.3795 
START 0.003472 0.003925 0.884565 0.3787 
START^2 -1.32E-07 4.66E-07 -0.283291 0.7776 
START*UNEMP -0.000248 0.000184 -1.346376 0.1816 
UNEMP 0.365511 1.226055 0.298119 0.7663 
UNEMP^2 -0.006355 0.026513 -0.239678 0.8111 
     
     R-squared 0.397498     Mean dependent var 0.034829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.216747     S.D. dependent var 0.043630 
S.E. of regression 0.038613     Akaike info criterion -3.466753 
Sum squared resid 0.134187     Schwarz criterion -2.809302 
Log likelihood 232.5384     F-statistic 2.199152 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.973482     Prob(F-statistic) 0.003026 
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Table A4: White Heteroskedasticity Test for Period 2000-2006 
 
     
F-statistic 1.747401     Probability 0.039377 
Obs*R-squared 38.40970     Probability 0.071612 
     
     Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Sample: 2000M01 2006M12   
Included observations: 84   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.431773 72.71647 0.074698 0.9407 
PERCP -9.224197 11.91504 -0.774164 0.4421 
PERCP^2 0.842215 0.783053 1.075553 0.2867 
PERCP*INCOME -0.013582 0.124206 -0.109348 0.9133 
PERCP*POP 6.296606 33.39568 0.188546 0.8511 
PERCP*RNMAR 0.695337 0.892876 0.778760 0.4394 
PERCP*START 0.000342 0.001239 0.275591 0.7839 
PERCP*UNEMP 0.875210 0.724916 1.207325 0.2324 
INCOME 0.333150 2.360522 0.141134 0.8883 
INCOME^2 -0.009806 0.028531 -0.343710 0.7324 
INCOME*POP -0.501822 5.277661 -0.095084 0.9246 
INCOME*RNMAR 0.012501 0.128860 0.097010 0.9231 
INCOME*START -0.000132 0.000229 -0.574626 0.5678 
INCOME*UNEMP 0.091310 0.130342 0.700542 0.4865 
POP 250.0187 304.3254 0.821551 0.4148 
POP^2 -3013.414 873.8816 -3.448309 0.0011 
POP*RNMAR 35.16994 21.78616 1.614325 0.1121 
POP*START -0.030385 0.050111 -0.606347 0.5467 
POP*UNEMP 15.42516 15.96818 0.965994 0.3382 
RNMAR -7.681548 8.864404 -0.866561 0.3899 
RNMAR^2 0.250664 0.332914 0.752940 0.4546 
RNMAR*START -0.000311 0.001075 -0.289391 0.7734 
RNMAR*UNEMP 0.413501 0.474883 0.870743 0.3876 
START 0.017949 0.017592 1.020329 0.3120 
START^2 -1.29E-06 1.78E-06 -0.724742 0.4716 
START*UNEMP -0.001011 0.001013 -0.998715 0.3222 
UNEMP -5.234676 7.561370 -0.692292 0.4916 
UNEMP^2 0.073662 0.266263 0.276650 0.7831 
     
     R-squared 0.457258     Mean dependent var 0.211374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.195579     S.D. dependent var 0.315290 
S.E. of regression 0.282782     Akaike info criterion 0.572923 
Sum squared resid 4.478088     Schwarz criterion 1.383195 
Log likelihood 3.937227     F-statistic 1.747401 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.477210     Prob(F-statistic) 0.039377 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
In this appendix, a different empirical analysis is conducted in search for the 
bubble symtoms for the house prices. Departing from the regression conducted in the 
empirical part; instead of using the levels of personal income, population and 
housing starts, the percentage changes are used. The regression is done for the whole 
period Jan 1990 – Dec 2006. A dummy variable is used which is equal to 1 for the 
bubble period starting from January 2000. Additionally, to capture the different 
effects of the bubble, the interaction terms of bubble dummy with all variables are 
used. The regression results are presented in Table A5.  
 
The adjusted R-squared of the regression is 0.91 which gives a reasonable 
goodness of fit. Percentage change in consumer prices has a positive coefficient, 
however it is not significant. On the other hand, the coefficient for the percentage 
change in income is significant at 1% and negative representing that the increase in 
income decreases the house prices. This interpretation, however does not represent 
the reality. Thus the coefficient has a wrong sign. Percentage change in the 
population is positive but does not have a significant influence. Mortgage rates have 
negative coefficient, meaning an increase in the mortgage rates decreases the house 
prices. However, the coefficient does not have a significant impact. The change in 
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the housing starts as well does not influence house prices significantly. 
Unemployment rate on the other hand, has a negative and significant coefficient 
indicating that an increase in the unemployment rate negatively affects the increase 
in the houseprices. The significant dummy variable for the bubble indicates that 
during bubble period, the increase in the house prices were almost 3.24 times faster 
than the corresponding increase prior to the bubble period which reflects the 
irrational increase in the house prices. The interaction terms indicate the effects of 
the fundamentals during bubble period compared to their influence prior to the 
bubble period. The interaction of the dummy with CPI reflects an almost 
insignificant, negative coefficient. This indicates that compared to the “normal” 
period, the increase of the consumer prices decreases the house prices. Interaction 
term with income represents a 5% significant and positive coefficient indicating a 
percent increase in income during bubble period positively influences the house 
prices compared to the previous period. The coefficient for the interaction term with 
population is 5% significant and positive. If we try to interpret the coefficient; a 1 % 
increase in population increases house prices by 16% which is not a rational 
influence. The interaction of dummy with mortgage rates and housing starts do not 
have significant influence on house prices. The significance of AR(1) and MA(1) 
indicate that previous realizations of the house prices predict the initial value of the 
variable.  
 
Consequently the analysis in the appendix also provides the proof for the 
existance of bubble, indicating the structural break and the irrational influences of the 
fundamentals during the bubble period. Once again the break in the relationship 
between the house prices and consumer prices is encountered.   
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Table A5. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent OLS for 1990-
2006 
 
Dependent Variable: PERHPI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M04 2006M12  
Included observations: 201 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 27 iterations  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4) 
Backcast: 1990M02 1990M03   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PERCP 0.103588 0.114949 0.901170 0.3687 
PERINCOME -4.243786 1.057873 -4.011621 0.0001 
PERPOP 0.715122 3.774976 0.189437 0.8500 
RNMAR -0.042564 0.075267 -0.565501 0.5724 
PERSTART 0.047250 0.150350 0.314268 0.7537 
UNEMP -0.205254 0.074688 -2.748163 0.0066 
DUM 3.245467 1.649927 1.967037 0.0507 
C -1.597680 1.437895 -1.111124 0.2680 
CPIDUM -0.265024 0.158204 -1.675206 0.0956 
INCOMEDUM 3.757652 1.499341 2.506202 0.0131 
POPDUM 16.12386 8.170906 1.973326 0.0500 
RNMARDUM -0.084118 0.124027 -0.678224 0.4985 
STARTDUM -0.259662 0.220527 -1.177465 0.2405 
UNEMPDUM 0.580981 0.142021 4.090799 0.0001 
AR(1) 1.336385 0.125723 10.62963 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.554663 0.116477 -4.762003 0.0000 
MA(1) -0.074764 0.135375 -0.552274 0.5814 
MA(2) 0.323968 0.087405 3.706534 0.0003 
     
     R-squared 0.916917     Mean dependent var 0.499886 
Adjusted R-squared 0.909199     S.D. dependent var 0.696518 
S.E. of regression 0.209883     Akaike info criterion -0.199244 
Sum squared resid 8.061340     Schwarz criterion 0.096575 
Log likelihood 38.02398     F-statistic 118.8008 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.984522     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots  .67-.33i      .67+.33i  
Inverted MA Roots  .04+.57i      .04-.57i  
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
